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ABSTRACT
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor?
To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We
then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern
California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of potential limitations to
the use of auctions. Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is
incomplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions stifle communication between
buyers and the sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor's expertise when designing
the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed.
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Manufactured goods, such as computers, washing machines and DVD players are mass
produced, have standardized characteristics and are typically purchased at list price.
O t h e rg o o d s ,s u c ha sn e wb u i l d i n g s ,ﬁ g h t e rj e t so rc o n s u l t i n gs e r v i c e sa r et a i l o r e dt oﬁ t
a buyer’s needs. To procure these customized goods, the buyer hires a contractor who
supplies the good according to a set of desired speciﬁcations.
An important decision that such a buyer faces is whether to award a procurement
contract by using an auction or by negotiating with a seller. The theoretical literature
emphasizes the beneﬁts of competitive auctions as sale or procurement mechanisms (see,
e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). These beneﬁts, as well as arguments for equal oppor-
tunity and corruption prevention, provide a justiﬁcation for statutes, such as the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), that strongly favor the use of auctions in the U.S. public
sector.
Interestingly, there is widespread use of both auctions and negotiations in the pri-
vate sector. For example, from 1995 to 2000, forty-four percent of private sector non-
residential building construction projects in Northern California were procured using
negotiations, while only eighteen percent were procured using open competitive bidding.
This paper oﬀers a framework to compare auctions with negotiations and empirically ex-
amines procurement practices in the private sector of the building construction industry.
We begin our analysis by constructing a simple framework that guides our empirical
analysis. In particular, we use a reduced form model that builds on the recent work
of Bajari and Tadelis (2001), henceforth BT. They model the buyer’s dual choice of
contractual incentives and design completeness, when describing projects is costly and
renegotiating ex post adaptations to the project involves potential frictions. They show
that ﬁxed price contracts provide good ex ante cost incentives but impose high frictions
when ex post adaptations are needed. Cost plus contracts, on the other hand, better
accommodate ex post adaptation but suﬀer from the lack of ex ante cost incentives. BT
conclude that ﬁxed-price contracts perform well for simple projects with few anticipated
changes, while cost-plus contracts are better suited for more complex projects, for which
many changes are anticipated.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis follows from the analysis in BT. We argue that ﬁxed price con-
tracts lend themselves to competitive bidding while cost-plus contracts do not, implying
that the choice between auctions and negotiations is bundled with the choice of contrac-
tual form. Thus, more complex projects–for which ex post adaptations are expected–
1are more likely to be negotiated, while simpler projects will be awarded through com-
petitive bidding.
This hypothesis is also consistent with conventional wisdom from the engineering
management literature, which suggests that sealed-bid auctions stiﬂe communication
between the buyer and the contractor. In a sealed-bid auction, the principle piece of
information that the buyer receives from the sellers is the bid. In negotiations, how-
ever, the buyer usually discusses the project in detail with the seller before the contract
is signed. Sellers might have important information about appropriate construction
practices and current materials prices that buyers can use when drafting the plans and
speciﬁcations. Communication and coordination between the buyer and seller is more
important in complex projects, oﬀering an alternative explanation for the correlation
between complex projects and the use of negotiations that is consistent with our ﬁrst
hypothesis.
A second hypothesis follows directly from standard auction theory: more potential
bidders increases the beneﬁts of using an auction. Thus, when contractors have more
idle capacity, the beneﬁts of an auction increase. On the other hand, during construction
booms it may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd a contractor, lowering the beneﬁts to auctions.
An indirect implication of our approach, which echoes the conventional wisdom of
industry, is that a buyer should select a “reputable” contractor if a negotiation is used
since ﬁrms diﬀer in their ability to carry out complex projects at reasonable costs. Buy-
ers should therefore rely on past performance and reputation to select a contractor for
negotiations. Thus, a third hypothesis is that negotiated contracts are more likely to be
allocated to more reputable sellers.
The hypotheses are tested using a data set of contracts awarded in the building
construction industry in Northern California from 1995-2001. The empirical analysis
appears to be consistent with the hypotheses. First, more complicated projects are
more likely to be awarded by negotiation than by auction. Second, the use of auctions is
counter-cyclical, consistent with the use of auctions when more contractors are available.
Third, negotiated projects tend to be awarded to larger, more experienced contractors,
consistent with the reputation hypothesis.
While the analysis is motivatedby practices in the private sector, it oﬀers implications
for the public sector. Public sector statute which governs procurement, typically based
on FARs, strongly favors the use of competitive bidding. In the data, for instance, ninety-
seven percent of public sector building construction projects in Northern California are
procured using competitive bidding. While competitive bidding does have the advantage
2of unbiased awarding of projects, it fails to respond optimally to ex post adaptation. This
suggests that public procurement of complex projects are suﬀering from eﬃciency losses.
This paper adds to a growing empirical literature on auctions and procurement.
Recent empirical research on auctions, such as Hendricks and Porter (1995), Hendricks,
Pinkse and Porter (2001) and Paarsch (1992) attempt to test whether observed bidding
behavior is consistent with the predictions of information economics. Recent empirical
work on the choice of contractual form, such as Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Corts
(2002), Corts and Singh (2003) and Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) study the determinants of
contractual form. However, one question that this literature has not addressed is when
should a buyer award a contract using an auction or a negotiation, and how this may tie
to the choice of contractual form. Our paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the ﬁrst
empirical study of this question.
Theoretical research on the choice of award mechanisms is also somewhat scant.
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that a seller should prefer using a simple (no reserve
price) auction to the best possible negotiation with one less buyer. They use this result to
claim that, “No amount of bargaining power is as valuable to the seller as attracting one
extra bona ﬁde buyer” (p.180). Moreover, they claim that this argument should apply
for procurement and regulation. Manelli and Vincent (1995) develop an alternative
framework and show that in some cases sequential oﬀers, which they call negotiations,
may be better than an auction. While these are both interesting theoretical papers, we
focus on distinct trade-oﬀs between auctions and negotiations that lend themselves to
empirical testing.
2 The Building Construction Industry
2.1 Overview
To understand the trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent procurement practices, we begin with some
background information on the construction industry. In 1992, there were 2 million
establishments in the United States construction industry that completed $528 billion
dollars of work. These ﬁrms directly employed 4.7 million workers and had a payroll
of $118 billion dollars (Census 1992a,b,c). In 1997, the construction industry accounted
for 8 percent of U.S. GDP and worldwide was a 3.2 trillion dollar market (Engineering
News-Record 1998).
In the industry there is typically a division of labor between creating the designs for
3the project and the actual construction. The buyer ﬁrst hires an architectural ﬁrm to
design the project and monitor the contractor during construction, while the contractor
is liable to the buyer for project completion, and directs the work of subcontractors.1
Since every construction project is unique, the plans and speciﬁcations included in
the contract may fail in the ﬁeld and are therefore subject to change. If the plans
and speciﬁcations are signiﬁcantly altered, then the contract will be amended by ﬁling
a change order. Change is the source of acrimonious disputes. The buyer wishes
to minimize the cost due to the change and may believe that the changes are due to
inadequate workmanship by the contractor. The contractor, on the other hand, may
believe that the changes are due the buyer’s poor planning and incomplete speciﬁcations.
In the engineering and construction management literature, coping with change plays a
key role in selecting appropriate contract award procedures.2
2.2 Construction Contracts
The contracts used in private sector building construction are frequently standardized
and typically contain six major parts: bidding documents, general conditions of the
contract, supplementary conditions of the contract, speciﬁcations, drawings and reports
of investigations of physical site conditions.
The speciﬁcations and drawings contain detailed engineering information about ex-
actly how the project is to be completed. They are meant to be a suﬃciently clear
description of how the project is to be built so that the contractor may estimate costs
in order to bid. Substantial deviations from the speciﬁcations and drawings will result
in change orders to the project. The report on physical site conditions often contains
geotechnical descriptions of subsurface soil and rock conditions, often including soil de-
scriptions of soil borings from the project site.
The general conditions of the contract deﬁne, in general terms, the participants in
the contract–i.e. owner (buyer), general contractor, engineer, subcontractors, etc.–
1Other possible organizational forms include design-and-build contracts, force accounting, and con-
struction management among others. For general descriptions of the industry, contracting practices and
project management see Bartholomew (1998), Clough and Sears (1994), and Hinze (1993).
2There are several common sources of change. First, design failures occur when drawings and
technical speciﬁcations drafted by architects do not perform as expected in the ﬁeld. Second, if actual
site conditions diﬀer from initial reports, then the costs and schedule may be aﬀected. Third, if the
general contractor and architect are working in an unfamiliar location, they may not be cognizant of
all local rules and regulations which results in changed plans. Finally, bad weather conditions can slow
down construction work resulting in scheduling problems and increased total project completion time.
4and their roles, the process for amending the contract with change orders, the contrac-
tor’s liability for on time completion of the contract and procedures for extending the
completion date, terms describing how payments will be made, and conditions under
which the contract may be terminated. In many cases, the general conditions are a
“boilerplate” that is similar from contract to contract.
The standard form of contracts published by the American Institute of Architects
(AIA) andthe Associated General Contractors (AGC) are usedinmany building projects.3
Because these contracts are widely used, the central clauses are well understood in in-
dustry and there exists a signiﬁcant body of case law on interpreting these contracts.
While there are many forms of alternative contractual arrangements, cost-plus (referred
to as cost-plus a stipulated fee) and ﬁxed price contracts appear to be the most com-
monly used. In a ﬁxed price contract, the compensation for the contractor is agreed to
in advance. In a cost plus contract, the general contractor is paid a fee and reimbursed
for the costs incurred to complete the project. Competitive bidding is associated with
ﬁxed price contracts while cost plus contracts are frequently negotiated between a buyer
and contractor.
2.3 Change Orders
The courts have recognized that contractors are entitled to compensation for changes to
the plans and speciﬁcations in a ﬁxed price contract (for a discussion of this see Sweet,
1994). Therefore, in a ﬁxed price contract, the general contractor will not be willing
to perform duties beyond those to which he is contractually bound without additional
compensation. Two contractual procedures used to adjust compensation in ﬁxed price
contracts are called change orders and change directives.
A change order is a written amendment to the contract that describes additional work
the contractor must undertake, and the compensation he will receive. AIA document
A201 deﬁnes a change order as a “written instrument prepared by the Architect and
signed by the Owner, Contractor and Architect, stating their agreement upon all of the
following: (1) a change in the work; (2) the amount of the adjustment in the Contract
sum, if any; and (3) the extent of the adjustment in the contract time, if any.” The work
and the conditions in a change order are generally determined by bargaining between
3According to the industry sources we have spoken with, these standard forms of contracts are more
common among less experienced buyers. Very large and experienced buyers may design their own
standard forms of contract for building construction.
5the buyer, contractor and architect.4
2.4 Some Stylized Facts
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are take from Hester et al. (1991), who summarize the results of six
studies (reports) of procurement contracting in the construction management literature.
Table 2.1 summarizes the eﬀect of change on total project completion costs. In all
of these studies, less than half of the projects are completed with changes of under two
percent. While changes of ﬁve percent or more are not the norm, they do occur regularly.
Table 2.2 summarizes the sources of change. The most common sources of changes are
defective plans and speciﬁcations, changes in project scope and diﬀering site conditions.5
Ibbs et al. (1986) quantify the impact of 96 diﬀerent contract clauses on project
performance in building construction. Their study consisted of a survey of buyers and
contractors for 36 building construction projects. They claim to verify some conventional
wisdoms about cost plus and ﬁxed price contracting that are summarized in Table 2.3.
The ﬁrst two facts are easily explained: the allocation of risk is obvious, and a
multi-task model can explain how cost reducing incentives adversely aﬀect quality (see
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The other points imply that changes are more easily
agreed upon under cost-plus contracting, while ﬁxed price contracts require the buyer
to invest more in design and speciﬁcation. BT develop a theoretical model that oﬀers
an explanation for these facts. The essentials of their model, and it’s adaptation to the
question of choosing between auctions and negotiations is the focus of the next section.
4If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, in many contracts the architect has the power to
issue a change directive. This is described as “a written order prepared by the architect and signed by
the owner and architect, directing a change in the work and stating a proposed basis for adjustment...
A construction change directive shall be used in the absence of total agreement on the terms of a change
order.” If the contract amount cannot be agreed to by bargaining between the parties, the contractor
may be paid by what is called force accounting, which is described as follows: “If the contractor does
not respond promptly or disagrees with the method for adjustment in the contract sum, the method
and the adjustment shall be determined by the architect on the basis of reasonable expenditures and
savings of those performing the work attributable to the change, including, in the case of an increase in
the contract sum, a reasonable allowance for overhead and proﬁt.” (For more details on change orders,
directives, and force accounting, see AIA document A201.) In practice, using change directives or force
accounting will involve signiﬁcant transaction costs. The working relationship between the buyer and
the contractor is likely to be spoiled, much additional paper work will be required and the parties must
spend time on frequently acrimonious renegotiation.
5Some of the totals in Table 2.2 sum to more than 100 percent because some studies allow multiple
causes for a single change.
63 Auctions Versus Negotiations: Theory
This section lays out a reduced form model of the buyer’s choice problem that is based
on the BT model, and applies it to the method of contract award. Consider a buyer who
wishes to procure a project from a seller. If the project is built according to his needs,
the buyer will obtain a value of v. For a project to be constructed the buyer must provide
the seller with plans and speciﬁcations that describe the project. This is the buyer’s ﬁrst
choice parameter: how much design to perform ex ante, where more design means a
more detailed account of the plans and speciﬁcations. As Section 2.4 suggests, a more
accurate design and description of a project reduces the need to renegotiate changes ex
post.
It is instructive to consider a complete design as a list of blueprints and instructions
that fully describe the project. Let τ ∈ [0,1] represent the fraction of instructions
that are actually written down by the buyer, and interpret τ as the probability that ex
post contingencies are covered by the contract’s plans, and no ex post adaptation will be
needed. With probability 1−τ a contingency will arise for which their are no instructions,
implying that the plan as speciﬁed will not result in the successful completion of the
project, and the buyer will not obtain the value v.
We interpret τ as the contractual completeness of the project’s design. We suppress
the state space model of BT and focus on its derived reduced form. In particular, let
T ≥ 0 b eas c a l a rt h a tr e p r e s e n t st h ecomplexity of the project, where higher values
of T imply a more complex project. One natural interpretation of T is the number of
instructions required to completely specify the project.
It is costly to provide plans and speciﬁcations. In particular, providing a design of
completeness τ ∈ [0,1] for a project of complexity T costs the buyer d(τ,T).B Td e r i v e
three very intuitive properties of d(τ,T). First, for a given level of complexity T,t h e
costs of design are increasing in the amount of design completeness τ. Second, the cost
of guaranteeing a ﬁxed probability of ex post speciﬁcation τ is increasing in complexity
T. Finally, the more complex a project, the higher is the marginal cost of increasing the
probability of speciﬁcation, so that
∂2d(τ,T)
∂τ∂T > 0.
The buyer’s second choice is what cost incentives the seller should receive, where
higher incentives mean that the seller bears more of the costs of production. Following
BT we focus on two extreme contractual forms. Let y ∈{ 0,1} represent this choice
variable, where y =1is a cost plus (low) incentive scheme, and y =0is a ﬁxed price
(high) incentive scheme.
7If the design covers the ex post contingencies then the buyer obtains a payoﬀ of v
and incurs a cost of c(y). Stronger incentives naturally imply a lower cost of production,
so c(0) <c (1).6 In the event that the design does not cover the ex post contingencies
(which happens with probability 1 − τ) then the buyer still incurs the costs c(y),b u t
obtains a lower payoﬀ of v(y) ≤ v. In the event that the design needs modiﬁcations
then we a cost plus contract easily adapts to cover additional changes, where a ﬁxed
price contract would need to be renegotiated, which generally involves more haggling
and friction. This idea is captured by the strict inequality v(0) <v (1),w h i c hs a y st h a t
if changes are needed then the ex post surplus with a ﬁxed price contract is lower than
that with a cost plus contract. This is derived in BT by showing that in the presence
of ex post incomplete information, ﬁxed-price incentives dissipate ex post surplus due to
costly renegotiation, whereas with cost-plus contracts ex post surplus is not reduced.7
We argue that this choice of incentives is strongly tied to the choice of award mech-
anism, namely, the choice between an auction and a negotiation. As most practitioners
would readily agree, “[a] cost-plus contract does not lend itself well to competitive bid-
ding.” (Hinze, p. 144.) Indeed, “[m]ost negotiated contracts are of the cost-plus-fee
type” (Clough and Sears, p. 10.)
One might suggest that bidders can bid over the “plus” portion of the contract.
However, as the “plus” is often only a fraction of the costs, this can be quite a disastrous
way to select a contractor under very reasonable assumptions. For example, if more cost
eﬃcient contractors have better outside options, then their reservation option would be
inversely related to their cost eﬀectiveness, and it is the highest cost contractor who
will win such an auction. Furthermore, if complex projects that are tied to cost plus
contracts require contractors that have more expertise, and thus are in higher demand
for such projects, then again we would expect their reservation option to be higher than
contractors with less expertise.
This suggests that if a cost-plus contract is chosenthenit will be “normally negotiated
between the owner and the contractor.” (Clough and Sears, p. 137.) On the other hand,
it is quite obvious that ﬁxed-price contracts immediately lend themselves to competitive
bidding, and the facts indicate that contracts procured through auctions are of the ﬁxed-
6In BT this is generated by a standard moral hazard problem in which the seller will have stronger
incentives to reduce costs when his payment is closer to a ﬁxed-price contract where he bears all the
costs. Some of these cost savings are enjoyed by the buyer.
7In BT there is an explicit cost of adaptation that is the contractors ex post private information, even
though ex ante there was symmetric uncertainty about ex post adaptations.
8price from. Thus, by choosing a cost-plus contract, the buyer is de facto choosing to
negotiate, whereas by choosing a ﬁxed-price contract the buyer can award the contract
using an auction. In this way we bundle the choice of the award mechanism with the
choice of contractual form.
Once ﬁxed price contracts are associated with an auction, it is well known that
the beneﬁts from an auction will generally depend on the number of bidders who will
participate. In particular, in independent private value auctions, which seem like a
reasonable environment for construction building, more bidders will generate a lower
expected bid. Thus, we would expect the costs c(·) that result from an auction to be
decreasing in the number of participating bidders, N.8
When negotiation is considered, “[i]t is common practice for a private owner to forgo
the competitive bidding process entirely and to hand-pick a contractor on the basis of
reputation and overall qualiﬁcations to do the job.” (Clough and Sears, p. 10.) Thus,
we assume that cost-plus contracts are awarded by negotiation, and do not model the
negotiation process.
To address the eﬀect of N on negotiations we assume that ﬁxed price incentives
will lower production costs by more than from selecting the most reputable contractor
with cost-plus incentives. In particular, we will make the extreme assumption that once
a cost-plus/negotiation choice is made, then production costs c(·) are higher than if a
ﬁxed-price/auction choice is made. Incorporating this assumption with the fact that an
auction results in costs that are decreasing in N, gives the following condition:
c(1,N) >c (0,1) >c (0,2) > ···>c (0,N) for all N ≥ 1. (1)




uB(y,τ;T,N)=τv +(1−τ)v(y) −c(y,N) −d(τ,T), (2)
and monotone comparative statics imply the following (proven in the appendix):
8This can be easily shown for a second price auction since the second order statistic is decreasing
in N. In this environment with risk neutral bidders there is a revenue equivalence theorem. It is well
known, however, that the cost of preparing a bid is not trivial, and models of auctions with entry costs
have been analyzed. One can argue that the costs of preparing a bid would depend on the complexity of
the project, creating some correlation between τ and N. We assume that this can be neglected, and it
seems that more detailed modelling can accommodate such a case.
9Proposition 1: Fixing the number of bidders, more complex projects are more likely to
be negotiated, while simpler projects are more likely to be procured using auctions.
Holding complexity ﬁxed, an increase in the number of available bidders makes
auctions more attractive.
This generates two hypotheses: (i) more complex projects are more likely to be nego-
tiated, and (ii) when less bidders are available, projects are more likely to be negotiated.
There are, however, other factors beyond our simple theoretical model that may bear
on the choice of award mechanism. In what follows, we spell out what we believe is a
comprehensive list, given what we have learned from industry participants.
Our theoretical approach diﬀers from the standard literature on procurement, where
there is typically no uncertainty about the project characteristics but rather about the
builder’s costs for completing the project (see Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). In the ﬁeld,
however, the plans and speciﬁcations in the contract are not always suﬃciently detailed
to successfully complete the project. Competitive bidding for ﬁxed price contracts
performs poorly when the product designs are incomplete because substantial ex post
adjustments are required. This fact is extensively documented in the engineering and
construction management literature (see Bartholomew (1998), Clough and Sears (1994),
Hinze (1993) and Sweet (1994)).
Clearly, our theoretical framework abstracts away from other potentially important
determinants of contractual form and award mechanism. For example, we ignore hidden
information such as a contractor’s ability to complete the job adequately, which may
lead to problems of adverse selection (though we discuss some practices that help with
such problems in section 5). In what follows below we describe some other determinants
of the award mechanism that have been suggested by industry sources.
Coordination ex ante. Another limitation of auctions is that they stiﬂe coordination
between buyer and contractor before the plans and speciﬁcations are ﬁnalized, since the
primary information that the buyer receives from sellers is their bid. This “[s]eparation of
design and construction deprives the owner of contractor skill during the design process,
such as sensitivity to the labor and materials markets, knowledge of construction tech-
niques, and their advantages, disadvantages and costs. A contractor would also have the
ability to evaluate the coherence and completeness of the design and, most important,
the costs of any design proposed.” (Sweet, 1994)
Furthermore, it is widely believed that when competitive bidding is used to award
a ﬁxed-price contract, the contractors strategically read the plans and speciﬁcations to
10determine where they will fail. Suppose that contractor A sees a ﬂaw in the plans
that will cause a change leading to $1 million dollars of proﬁts, and that the other
N − 1 contractors are unaware of this ﬂaw. Contractor A will likely win the job since
he would be willing to bid less than contractors who do not see the ﬂaws in the plans.
Competitive bidding may therefore leads to adverse selection, which is more problematic
when projects are complex.
In negotiations, however, the buyer and contractor typically spend a good deal of time
discussing the project before work begins. If the buyer can elicit the contractor’s views
about where the designs and speciﬁcations can be improved, then negotiations might
be preferable to auctions. The industry literature suggests that one merit of cost plus
contracting and negotiation is that buyers and contractors spend more time discussing
the project and ironing out possible pitfalls before work begins.
Reputation. The preceding argument implies that beneﬁts to the buyer from choosing
negotiation will be greatest when the contractor reveals pitfalls with the plans and spec-
iﬁcations. Therefore, we might expect the choice of negotiations to be correlated with
the selected contractor’s good “reputation” for partnering with buyers and architects in
negotiated projects (recall the quote from Clough and Sears, p.10 mentioned above).
Red Tape. Industry sources have suggested that choosing a contractor using nego-
tiation involves less “red tape” than competitive bidding. Awarding a project through
competitive bidding usually begins with advertising the project in an industry periodical
for a number of weeks. The contractors then pick up the plans and speciﬁcations from
the buyer, prepare cost estimates and submit bids at the pre-speciﬁed time and place.
In contrast, when a project is negotiated, there is no need to advertise and consequently
a contract can be signed with considerably less delay. One implication of this story is
that more experienced buyers should be more familiar with the bureaucratic procedures
associated with competitive bidding and use competitive bidding more frequently, all
else held constant.
Privacy. Another drawback of open competitive bidding is that a complete set of the
buyer’s plans and speciﬁcations for the project must be made available to all bidders.
These plans and speciﬁcations may contain sensitive information about business strategy,
such as markets in which the buyer wishes to expand. In such circumstances, the buyer
will wish to maintain the privacy of these plans and speciﬁcations by using negotiation
as the award mechanism.
114T h e D a t a
4.1 General Description
Our data includes non-residential building construction projects in Northern California
during the period 1995-2000. The data was purchased from Construction Market Data
Group (CMD), a ﬁrm that sells information about upcoming projects to contractors
through periodicals, its website, and access to local CMD reporters and plan rooms.
For many contractors, CMD is a primary source of information for learning about con-
struction projects.9 The data consists of approximately 25,600 projects, of which roughly
4,100 were awarded in the private sector. We focus on the private sector jobs since most
public sector projects are required by statute to use open competitive bidding.
The unit of observation in our data set is a non-residential building construction
project. Each observation includes project characteristics such as the location of the
project site, a detailed description of the work to be done, the estimated project value (an
engineering cost estimate), the award mechanism (auction or negotiation), the number of
bidders, the date that bids were due and bonding information. The data does not include
any information on project outcomes or the form of contract that is used. However,
as we argued earlier, industry sources have documented that most of the negotiated
contracts are cost-plus, while practically all the auctioned contracts are ﬁxed-price. In
addition to the project characteristics, the data includes unique id numbers for the ﬁrms
involved in the project (the buyer, the bidders, and all the other major roles), as well as
their identity, allowing us to examine the dynamics of relationships between ﬁrms, how
frequently certain ﬁrms are active, as well as other tests that we describe below.
Four award mechanisms are used to select contractors. The ﬁrst is open competitive
bidding, in which following a broad advertisement of the project, any contractor who is
bonded is allowed to submit a bid. Notice that such bonds seriously reduce the hazards
of adverse selection and moral hazard, which to some extent question the applicability
of the mechanism design approach to procurement.10 The second, invited bidders,i sl i k e
9CMD estimates that their coverage is approximately 85-90% of all projects in the building construc-
tion market during this period. According to CMD, the missing projects are usually those that are too
small, or projects that the buyer does not want publicized.
10Three types of bonds are typically required by most owners. The ﬁrst is a bid bond that is typically
equal to ten percent of the bid. The surety, or bonding company, is liable for this amount if the contractor
reneges on its bid after it is awarded the contract. The second is a performance bond, typically equal to
the amount of the bid. The surety is liable up to this amount if the contractor fails to build according
to the plans and speciﬁcations. Finally, there is a payment bond, typically equal to the amount of
12open bidding except that only invited bidders are given contract information and are
allowed to bid. The buyer should make sure that an invited bidder is in a sound ﬁnancial
position so that it has suﬃcient resources to pay subcontractors and material suppliers
during construction and therefore will not ﬁle for bankruptcy while construction is taking
place. Furthermore, the buyer should verify that the contractor has suﬃcient experience
and free capacity to complete the project in a timely manner. The third, pre-qualiﬁed
bidders, which “is not a common practice” (Hinze, p. 95), is like open bidding with an
initial qualiﬁcation stage. For this procedure, ﬁrms who wish to compete must submit
speciﬁc information about their experience, ﬁnancial stability and other characteristics
before the buyer qualiﬁes them as viable bidders. Finally, in negotiation, the buyer
decides to forgo the bidding process altogether and picks a contractor directly.
4.2 Summary Statistics
In what follows, we begin by summarizing some key statistics in our data. Table 4.1
summarizes the size, value and other characteristics of the buildings in our data set. The
project value is an architect’s or engineer’s estimate of the total project cost. Before
construction begins, it is typical for the architectural ﬁrm that designs the plans and
speciﬁcations to compute an estimated cost.
From Table 4.1, we see that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in project size. The
average project value is approximately 9.5 million dollars with a standard deviation of
36 million dollars. The smallest project is near $10,000 in cost while the largest project
is close to $800 million in cost. The variation in other project characteristics, such as
ﬂoor area, ﬂoors above ground and parking spaces also demonstrates that our data set
contains a diverse set of projects.
Table 4.2, summarizes the distribution of award mechanisms. Nearly half of the jobs
are negotiated. Open competitive bidding is used for only 18 percent of the jobs, while
invited bidders is used for 37 percent of these projects. Since buyers use invited bidders
nearly twice as often as open competitive bidding, it appears that buyers frequently
prefer to restrict the set of ﬁrms allowed to bid.11
the bid, which guarantees that all subcontractors and material suppliers will be paid. If a contractor is
grossly negligent in performing its work, it will be very diﬃcult for it to be bonded for future contracts,
eﬀectively shutting the contractor out of business. See Clough and Sears (1994, ch. 7) and Hinze (1993,
ch. 8) for a more detailed discussion of bonding.
11Ye (2002) develops a model in which it is costly for bidders to learn their valuations, and in his
setting it is typically optimal for the auctioneer to restrict entry into the auctions. Since it is far from
13Table 4.3 summarizes the distribution of the number of jobs done by each ﬁrm in our
data set. The construction industry is extremely competitive with high entry and exit
rates that are commonly attributed to the low entry costs in construction, as compared
with other industries. Nearly sixty percent of the ﬁrms in our data set only complete
one job as a prime contractor.12 Many of these small ﬁrms in the Northern California
building construction industry work as subcontractors on other construction projects,
work on smaller projects not contained in our data set or have a short life-span.
5 Auctions Versus Negotiations: Evidence
We use a discrete choice econometric model to evaluate the theories discussed insection 3.
Most of the analysis will consist of logistic regressions with speciﬁcations that regress the
choice of award mechanism on possible explanatory variables such as project complexity,
the number of available contractors and buyer characteristics. We will later argue that
when a project is negotiated, a more reputable contractor should be chosen.
We proxy for complexity using three project characteristics: the (log) value of the
project, the (log) square feet of the project, and the number of divisions.T h ev a l u eo f
the project is a reasonable proxy for complexity since the number of hours to completely
document the plans and speciﬁcations is generally higher for projects with large esti-
mated values. Furthermore, projects that are more complex are typically more costly to
construct. The log square feet of the building is a reasonable proxy for complexity by
analogous arguments. The number of divisions indicates the number of sub-categories
of work, as deﬁned by CMD (such as electrical wiring, plumbing, dry walling, etc.)
that are required to complete the project. In general, the complexity of the plans and
speciﬁcations is also positively correlated with the number of divisions.
The “red tape” hypothesis asserts that the use of competitive bidding will be used
more often by buyers who are more experienced and build frequently. We proxy for the
buyer’s experience with three variables. First, we use an “cumulative experienced buyer”
dummy that is equal to one if the buyer has appeared in our data-set in at least one
previous project. Second, we supplement our CMD data with credit data from Reference
trivial for contractors to discover their costs for a speciﬁc project, this may be a reason for the prevalence
of invited bidder auctions. A concern for quality may also explain the prevalence of these auctions.
12This is consistent with ﬁndings about the size distribution of ﬁrms in other branches of the construc-
tion industry. Bajari and Ye (2002) report that in the highway construction industry, about half of the
ﬁrms who bid never win a single large contract.
14USA, a web-based ﬁrm whose rating considers an businesses number of employees, years
in business, industry stability, census data, pay history, etc.13 This data includes credit
rating of a buyer (0-7) and a size measure of buyer (number of employees). We assume
that these measures are positively correlated with a buyer’s experience.
Our theoretical model in section 3 suggests that the choice between auctions and
negotiations will also depend on the number of available contractors. In the late 1990’s,
there was considerable ﬂuctuation in local construction activity which arose from the
varying fortunes of high technology companies. We control for this by including the six
month percentage change in the total volume of work awarded in the project’s county.
The construction industry is highly spatial. The majority of work performed by a
contractor will be close to a contractor’s headquarters. Since the number of contractors
will not adjust instantaneously to local, short-run demand shocks, we believe that our
control reasonably proxies for the number of available contractors.
Since we expect negotiations to be awarded to more reputable contractors, we proxy
for the reputation of the contractor using similar experience measures that we use for
buyer experience. We proceed to construct a dummy variable, “cumulative experienced
contractor,” which indicates whether the selected contractor has previously appeared in
our data-set, and we also use the credit and size data from Reference USA.14 Given the
high turnover of ﬁrms in the industry, we believe that these are reasonable proxies for
contractor reputation.
In table 5.1 we report estimates from a series of logit speciﬁcations as described
above, where yi =1if the project is negotiated yi =0if the project is competitively
bid. We deﬁne a project as “competitively bid” if it is awarded using invited bidders,
pre-qualiﬁed bidders or open competitive bidding. To check our results, table 5.2 reports
estimates from an ordered logit where the dependent variable is yi =3if the project is
negotiated, yi =2if invited bidders are used, and yi =1if open competitive bidding is
used. This ordering of the dependent variable arises from that fact that using invited
bidders, like negotiation, gives the buyer more discretion in the choice of contractor. We
discuss the possible implications of this later.
13Reference USA information is compiled from public sources such as Yellow Pages, annual reports, 10-
Ks and other SEC information, government data, Chamber of Commerce information, leading business
magazines, trade publications, newsletters, major newspapers, industry and specialty directories and
postal service information. There ratings are indicators of the ﬁnancial strength of the business.
14The credit rating is a measure of credit “worthiness” that Reference USA computes.
155.1 Complexity
In table 5.1 we observe a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between our
three measures of complexity and the use of negotiations. The speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst
column only includes log-project value (lprojval) and log-ﬂoor area (lﬂarea) and does
not include the number of divisions (divsum). This allows us a sample size of over 3000
projects, and the eﬀects of complexity are signiﬁcant when controlling for the cumulative
experience of the owner/buyer (expowncum). The other speciﬁcations in Table 5.1 add
our third proxy for complexity (divsum), which reduces the sample size to 682 projects.
When we control for the buyer characteristics we obtain signiﬁcance of our proxies of
complexity in all but the last speciﬁcation, in which the addition of the owner’s size
measure from Reference USA causes the sample to drop further to 465 projects. The
results of the third speciﬁcation are due to the reduced sample size.15
These results are consistent with the theory that suggests a positive correlation be-
tween negotiation and measures of complexity. From these results, however, it is not
possible to distinguish the theory from the “ex ante coordination” story. From our
conversations with industry sources and from reading the industry literature, it is our
impression that both of the motivations for negotiating are important in practice.
Since all three of our measures of complexity involve the scale, or size of the project,
an alternative explanation for the positive relationship between our proxies for com-
plexity and the use of negotiation would be a budget constraint argument: the larger a
project, the less there are contractors who have a “deep enough pocket” can compete
for it. As a result, auctions may not induce suﬃcient competition, hence negotiations
would represent a superior method in awarding the project. To test this hypothesis we
regress the number of bidders on project covariates. Table 5.4 shows that the number of
bidders increases with the value of the project, implying that the positive relationship
between project value and the choice of negotiations does not appear to arise from a
limited number of potential bidders. We run several speciﬁcations with dummies for
low, medium and high value projects (lpil, lpim, and lpih) and verify that the positive
relationship between project value and the number of bidders is maintained across all
value ranges, implying that the “deep pocket” hypothesis is not born out in the data.
This relationship is also prominent in the public sector as the two right columns of table
5.4 show.
15We ran the speciﬁcations of columns 2 and 3 on the sample of the last speciﬁcation and the results
were very similar.
16Another alternative story consistent with our results is that auctions are not used in
complex projects because buyers are more concerned about shirking on quality. In fact,
Table 2.3 suggests that ﬁxed price contracts are perceived as leading to lower quality.
While contractors can shirk, the degree to which they can shirk is limited due to bonding
requirements. When performing a ﬁxed-price contract, the contractor must submit a
performance bond obtained from a surety (bonding company). The surety is liable up
to the amount of the contractor’s bid if the contractor fails to build the project to plans
and speciﬁcations. The surety has no incentive to provide a bond for a contractor who
will shirk on quality, a practice that mitigates both adverse selection and moral hazard
problems.
From table 5.2, we see that invited bidders is implemented more frequently than
open competitive bidding for complex projects. We have found that this result is robust
to changes in our speciﬁcation, such as restricting attention only to the choice between
invited bidders and open competitive bidders. The most obvious interpretation is that
the when a project is more complex, the buyer may want to screen out those ﬁrms that
lack the necessary competency, capacity or cash to complete the project by awarding the
project using invited bidders. Furthermore, if submitting bids is more costly for more
complex projects, which seems to be the case, then there are advantages to restrict the
number of bidders (see Ye, 2002).
5.2 The Number of Bidders
In table 5.2 we ﬁnd that an increase in 6 Month County Volume (chydiﬀ) leads to an
increased use of negotiations. We interpret this result in the following way: When there
is an increase in the amount of work done in a county, the local contractors are busier,
leaving fewer contractors to bid on new work since construction is a rather local activity.
This is consistent with the prediction that negotiations are more attractive when fewer
bidders are available.
In table 5.4, we ﬁnd that the time dummies are statistically signiﬁcant and decreasing
over time. The years 1995-1999 correspond to a period of robust economic growth in
the bay area, brought on by a strong demand for high technology products and the
creation of many new high technology businesses. The year 1999 was the period of most
rapid growth in Northern California, 1998-1997 was more rapid than 1995-1996. Overall
demand for building construction rose sharply in these years. As a result, there was an
average of one less contractor bidding on any given job in 1999 as compared to 1995-1996.
17Not surprisingly, in Table 5.5, we see that open competitive bidding is only used for 10
percent of the projects in 1999 as compared to 18 percent in 1995. Overall, the results
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate that the use of negotiations tended to be pro-cyclical while
the use of auctions was counter-cyclical.
5.3 Reputation
In Table 5.3 we report results from logistic regressions of two reputation proxies (expbuild
and expbuildcum) on project and owner (buyer) characteristics, as well as on dummies
for the type of award mechanism treating open competitive bidding as the base-case.
We see that for all four speciﬁcations, both prequaliﬁcation and invited bidders select
for more reputable builders, and negotiations exhibit the same selection but signiﬁcantly
more pronounced. This ﬁnding is consistent with our discussion in Section 3 that more
reputable contractors should be selected when awarding a cost plus contract through the
use of negotiation.16
It is often suggested in the construction management literature that ﬁxed price con-
tractors aggressively seek change orders since their overall proﬁt will depend on revenues
derived from changes. In this highly competitive environment, ﬁrms who do not ag-
gressively seek changes will quickly be driven out of business. As a result, ﬁxed price
contractors and public sector contractors are perceived as more “ruthless” than ﬁrms
who perform cost plus contracts.
In ﬁgure 5.1 we plot a histogram of the fraction of work that is done by a given ﬁrm
in the private sector, and in ﬁgure 5.2 we plot a histogram of the fraction of work done
through negotiated contracts within the private sector (only for ﬁrms who complete more
than one contract). These results suggest that ﬁrms tend to specialize in either public
or private work, and within the private sector in either negotiated or competitively bid
work. According to industry sources, the most reputable contractors engage in cost plus
contracting, less reputable contractors are awarded ﬁxed price contracts in the private
sector and the least reputable are awarded contracts in the public sector. This is
further evidence, consistent with our discussion in section 3, that reputation plays a role
16Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) also ﬁnd a positive correlation between the reputation of software contrac-
tors and the use of cost plus contracts. Their interpretation is that the choice of contract is inﬂuenced
by the seller’s reputation, which diﬀers from our story. Using our data it is hard to tease out the causal
eﬀects of reputation, but when we control for seller characteristics, both with and without spacial loca-
tion as instruments, the signiﬁcance of project and buyer characteristics shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2 still
hold strong.
18in matching contractors to award mechanisms.
Economic theory suggests that a long-term relationship between a buyer and a con-
tractor can help to align the contractor’s incentives with the buyer’s. Therefore, one
might conjecture that such long-term relationships are one explanation for the more
frequent use of experienced contractors on negotiated projects. We found that pairings
between the same buyer and contractor are very infrequent in the data. We also found
that multiple pairings of the same contractor and architect are not very frequent. This
is a limitation of our 6 year period, and we cannot therefore investigate the relation-
ship between repeated interactions and the choice of award mechanism. (See Corts and
Singh(2002) for an analysis of this sort).
5.4 Buyer Characteristics
The results in Tables 5.1 through 5.3 demonstrate that more experienced buyers are
more likely to use competitive bidding. This is consistent with the “red tape hypothesis”
since more experienced buyers are likely to have lower administrative costs for awarding
a contract by competitive bidding. This result is signiﬁcant at conventional levels in all
of our speciﬁcations.
We have no direct evidence about the inﬂuence of privacy concerns in the auction
or negotiation choice. However, according to CMD, who has a large staﬀ of reporters
that search for upcoming jobs, buyers are often concerned about privacy.17 Buyers have
an incentive to keep their plans and speciﬁcations a secret when a new technology is
involved (e.g. when constructing a plant that will utilize a new manufacturing process)
or when a buyer is expanding his business into a new territory.
6 Discussion
6.1 Contractual Choice and Award Mechanisms
In their analysis of auctions versus negotiations, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) write that
for the sale of a company, “a single extra bidder more than makes up for any diminution
in negotiating power. This means that there is no merit in arguments that negotiation
should be restricted to one or a few bidders to allow the seller to maintain more control of
the negotiating process, or to credibly withdraw the company from the market.” [p.180].
17In the past, buyers got angry when CMD has advertised projects that they wished to keep secret.
19Though their main application is for the sale of a company, they also note that “in a
procurement context, competitive bidding by suppliers will yield lower average prices
than negotiating with a smaller number of suppliers.”
We believe that their conclusions are insightful for applications where the item being
bought or sold is well deﬁned, and there is no ex post stage where the ex ante committed
price needs to be renegotiated. Our analysis suggests that this is not the case for many
procurement projects, for which ex ante descriptions of the item may be incomplete,
causing ex post adaptation to be an important feature of the transaction..
As we have argued, two channels can make negotiations more attractive than auc-
tions. The ﬁrst, which we highlight in our model, is the need for ex post changes. An
optimal response to this problem is choosing cost-plus contracts, and these cannot be
a u c t i o n e di nas e n s i b l ew a y . 18 The second, which has been emphasized by some industry
participants, is using the knowledge and experience of a contractor before the designs
are complete and construction begins. As we have argued, if a project will be awarded
using competitive bidding then a contractor has an incentive to hide information about
possible design ﬂaws, submit a low bid, and recoup proﬁts when changes will be required.
Note that for this story of ex ante information sharing, weak cost incentives (like
cost plus contracts) may be important. With a ﬁxed price contract, strong incentives to
conceal problems and ex post renegotiate changes are still present.
6.2 Implications for Public Sector Policy
In the public sector, statutes such as the FARs (and the many statutes that are modeled
after the FARs) strongly favor the use of competitive bidding, and particularly open
competitive bidding when feasible. For instance, in our data set, ninety-seven percent of
the projects awarded in the public sector were awarded using open competitive bidding
as compared to only eighteen percent in the private sector.
Competitive bidding is perceived to select the lowest cost bidder, prevent corruption
and favoritism that are opposed to eﬃciency, and it oﬀers a clear yardstick with which to
compare oﬀers. According to an Ohio Court, competitive bidding “...gives everyone an
equal chance to bid, eliminates collusion, and saves taxpayers’ money... It fosters honest
competition in order to obtain the best work and supplies at the lowest possible price
18McAfee and McMillan (1986) introduce a model of adverse selection combined with moral hazard in
which it is optimal for a buyer to solicit bids, and pay ex post depending both on the bid and the ex
post realization of costs. They cannot have sensible bidding for cost-plus contracts, but in their model
cost-plus contracts are never optimal.
20because taxpayers’ money is being used. It is also necessary to guard against favoritism,
impudence, extravagance, fraud and corruption.” (See Sweet (1994), pp. 379).
One recent case that caused a stir in California was a 95 to 126 million dollar no-
bid contract that was awarded by California’s department of information technology to
Oracle for the long-term purchase of software database licenses. In a series of articles
over the past two years in the San Jose Mercury News by Noam Levey, it was suggested
that Oracle, through a series of contributions and lobbying eﬀorts, had inﬂuenced the
decision in their favor, and that ex post the contract was not considered an attractive
deal to the state of California. More recently, the award of “rebuilding Iraq” to Bechtel
has also raised concern about the transparency of awarding a huge contract (up to $680
million) through a process other than open competitive bidding, concerns that were
exacerbated due to Bechtel’s connections with the republican administration.
Our results suggest that for complex projects, there is a downside to the use of ﬁxed-
price contracts awarded through competitive bidding and that selecting a contractor
and negotiating with it may be the favorable course of action. This downside of open
competitive bidding can arise from a lack of input by contractors at the design stage,
from the need to proceed quickly without the ability to complete detailed plans and
speciﬁcations, and from the expectations that ex post haggling and frictions might occur
when changes are needed. An important practical question for public procurement is
whether one can design a set of objective rules for awarding negotiated contracts that
minimize transaction costs, but that are not easily subject to manipulation, corruption
or blatant favoritism.
6.3 Summary
Our paper oﬀers three contributions. First, we believe that this is the ﬁrst empirical
paper to examine the choice between auctions and negotiations in procurement. Our
empirical analysis is primarily descriptive, but it sheds some light on what we believe
is an important factor in procurement: the relationship between project complexity and
contractual response.
Second, we suggest some limitations of auctions, as compared to negotiations, that
have not been emphasized in the literature. In procurement, the standard assumption of
well deﬁned products, which is central to the mechanism design and auction literature,
is questionable. When ex post change is anticipated, the use of auctions, which often
requires ﬁxed price contracts, may be ineﬃcient.
21Finally, we question the eﬃciency of FARs that force public sector bureaucrats to
award ﬁxed-price contracts by competitive bidding. Our results suggest that there is
room to consider alternative ways to prevent corruption, like more costly but eﬀective
monitoring, and then allow the public sector to award contracts with the ﬂexibility and
speed used by the private sector. Given the sheer volume of public sector procurement,
it is clear that this approach begs for more serious research and evaluation.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1







= v(1) − v(0) > 0.
∂uB(y,τ;T,N)




∂T∂τ < 0. Similarly, uB(y,τ;T,N)
exhibits increasing diﬀerences in (N,−y) since uB(0,τ;T,N)−uB(1,τ;T,N) is increasing
in N by condition (1). Finally,
∂uB(y,τ;T,N)
∂τ is constant in N. Q.E.D.
24Tables
Table 2.1: Changes as a Percent of Total Contract Price
Report < 2.0% 2-5% 5-10% 10-15% > 15% Reduction
A. 44.5 31.0 13.9 3.4 4.2 3.0
B. 48.2 16.8 11.6 3.4 20.0
C. 50.0 40.5 9.5
D. 11.6 19.0 45.5 4.4 6.9 12.6
Table 2.2: The Frequency and Sources of Changes.
Cause ABCDEF
Defective Plans and Speciﬁcations 44.5 42.9 55.6 10.7 50.0 39.0
Changes in scope 44.7 13.5 44.8 40.4 17.0
Diﬀering Site Conditions 74.0 14.3 19.9 20.7 15.0
Schedule Delays 12.7 16.1 7.0 26.9
Value Engineering 4.0
Substitutions 29.1
Others 16.7 8.5 16.8 13.0
Table 2.3: FP versus C+ contracts in Construction
Fixed Price Cost plus
risk allocation mainly on contractor buyer
incentives for quality less more
buyer administration less more
good at minimizing costs time
documentation eﬀorts more less
ﬂexibility for change less more
adversarial relationship more less
25Table 4.1: Summary Statistics.
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Project Value 4085 9,506,236 3.60e+07 10,000 8.00e+08
Floor Area (sq.ft) 3030 187,894 2,750,522 300 9.00e+07
Floors above ground 4086 1.77 3.4 0.00 48.00
Parking spaces 4087 18.67 129.0 0.00 3,600










Invited Bidders 1,522 37.2 42 0.2
Prequaliﬁed Bids 44 1.1 394 1.8
Open Bidding 752 18.4 20,865 97
Negotiated 1,769 43.3 210 1
Total 4,087 100 21,511 100
Table 4.3: Distribution of ﬁrms by No. of jobs done, all jobs
No. of jobs done by ﬁrm Number Frequency % Cum %
1 757 59.3 59.3
2-5 387 30.3 89.6
6-10 83 6.5 96.1
11-20 37 2.9 99.0
> 20 13 1.0 100
26Table 5.1: Logistic regressions of award mechanism (negotiation =1)
on project and owner (buyer) characteristics

















































Sample size 3030 682 605 445 564
27Table 5.2: Ordered logistic regression for award mechanism
(Open Bidding=1, Invited Bidders=2, Negotiation=3)



































































Sample size 3004 2598 942 677 600 441 559
28Table 5.3: Logistic regression of Builder experience
on Project Value and Award Dummies
(standard errors in parentheses)



















































Sample size 3030 682 3030 677
29Table 5.4: Regression of Number of Bids Received
on Project Value and Year Dummies










































Sample size 306 306 10,703 10,703
Table 5.5: Award Method over Time
(Private Sector Only)
Year 1995 1995-6 1997 1998 1999 2000-1
Invited Bidders 45.5% 47.5% 47.2% 43.1% 40.8% 41.4%
Negotiated 36.4% 39.6% 41.4% 46.3% 48.0% 40.0%
Open Competitive Bidding 18.1% 11.8% 10.7% 9.1% 10.5% 16.6%
Prequaliﬁed Bidders 0.0% 1.1% 0.7% 1.5% 0.6% 2.0%
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Percent of Dollars Done in Private Sector
Figure 5.1: Fraction of work (in dollar value) done in the private sector for ﬁrms with



































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percent of Dollars Done Through Negotiation
Figure 5.2: Fraction of work (in dollar value) that is negotiated in the private sector
for ﬁrms with more than one job.
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